Dr. Wilde has a PhD in politics, and has studied racial bias and police violence, corruption and its measurement problems, and technology-mediated decision-making processes (aka AI), among other things. Seeing where things were headed, she decided to get the hell out of America in 2015. She has since resettled in Berlin with her beloved partner.
Previous: Internationally recognized security theater critic, still screaming about Bayes, Harvard Kennedy/UCLA Psychology postdoctoral scholar, transparency activist, Pacific Standard featured scholar, University of Virginia Politics Ph.D., high school dropout.
To me, Oscar Wilde best deals with the tension between truth-telling and peace-making that artists, whistleblowers, and other meaning-makers have always struggled with. That’s why I took his name. (Also so people would have to call me Dr. Wilde.)
Should you desire infrequent group email updates: Drop me a line.
Email-to: vera at verawil dot de
Phone: +49 151 5907 5245 (texts via Signal, Wire, or WhatsApp preferred)
Voice calls are annoying, social media is evil, tea is nice.
Should you wish to use encryption:
1. Know that it is effectively futile. End-point devices can be owned, social networks compromised, and your own defenses tricked by social engineering and other pressures to which ultimately no one is completely immune. Depending on your threat model, it’s likely encryption might buy you time, not anonymity.
2. Read McSweeney’s excellent The End of Trust: An investigation of surveillance in the digital age (2018), especially Soraya Okuda’s “The Postcards We Send: Tips on Staying Vigilant in the Information Age.”
As for encrypting any e-mail to me: The above address has two GPG keys on the servers; the one with key ID B4211EF1 is the one you should use. The fingerprint is F87B 7052 B262 C7D4 C648 F7C2 7911 1932 B421 1EF1.
I have Jabber/OTR encrypted chat at email@example.com ; my fingerprint for OTR is 6F7E4210 1E4E8311 CDD3F52B 437045D3 240A0119 ; encrypted video chat via UTox as Vera.
Related resources: Security Without Borders, The Citizen Lab, Tactical Tech, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and the further resources list in my brief guide to combatting mass surveillance and in the McSweeney’s piece cited above.